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The Accumulated Earnings Tax and the 
Problem of Diversification 
Although recent unprecedented growth in the nation's economy 
has resulted in increased profits for many corporations/ the rapidity 
of technological change and the intensity of competition are making 
it increasingly difficult for the executives of financially successful 
corporations to rest on their achievements. Lines· of products and 
even entire businesses may become outmoded over a short period 
of time. The stability of a static industry may be shaken by- the 
entry of a progressive new firm. In this context of uncertainty, 
businessmen · must continually seek means of ensuring continued 
corporate success. One common means is to expand corporate opera-
tions into diverse markets. Diversification is not always easy, however. 
New business opportunities are not always readily available, and 
when a new opportunity does arise a corporation must be prepared 
to move swiftly. Thus, liquid funds must be immediately obtain-
able.2 Corporations planning internal financing of diversification 
encounter an additional problem. Where funds for diversification 
are accumulated before specific plans are devised for their use, the 
corporation-especially a relatively small, family enterprise3-risks 
violating section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code. 4 
The purpose of section 531, prevention of the use of the cor-
porate form to.avoid shareholder taxation, is accomplished by forcing 
corporations, under threat of a severe penalty tax, to distribute their 
earnings and profits. Were it not for section 531, corporations could 
accumulate funds in the corporate coffers so that shareholders could 
avoid the income tax on dividends, but could later take the funds 
out at capital gains rates. Shareholders could also use corporate 
accumulations as a means of income deferral, or, in some cases, as 
I. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsntAcr OF THE 
UNITED STATES 498 (86th ed. 1965). 
2. This may be a problem primarily of close corporations since acquisitions by other 
corporations are frequently accomplished by means of an exchange of stock. This 
method is usually unavailable for close corporations, however, because of the possibility 
of dilution of control of the corporation. 
3. As is often noted, as a practical matter the § 531 tax is applicable only to closely 
held corporations since shareholder tax saving is not likely to be the motive for 
retention where stock is widely held in relatively small lots. In 1954 it was proposed· 
that corporations with more than 1500 shareholders, no one of which held more 
than 10% of the stock, be specifically exempted from the operation of § 531. The 
Senate Finance Committee rejected the proposal, however, since it might be difficult 
for some "public" corporations to ~how that no shareholder owned more. than 10% 
of the stock when constructive ownership was considered, and also because § 531 was 
not usually applied to such corporations. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954). 
4. "Section 531" is a term commonly used to describe generally the provisions of 
the Code which deal with improper corporate accumulation of surplus, and the term 
will be so used in this comment. In actuality, it is §§ 531-37 which work together to 
determine the applicability of the accumulated earnings penalty tax. 
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a way of awaiting a stepped-up basis of the stock upon death. Section 
53 l combats these tax avoidance devices by imposing a penalty tax 
on corporations "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding" 
taxes on shareholders. 5 Although the purpose of tax avoidance is the 
ultimate test of the applicability of section 531,6 the real contro-
versy central to almost all section 531 cases is whether an accumula-
tion of earnings and profits is for the reasonable needs of the business. 
The reasonableness issue is crucial for two reasons. First, a finding 
that an accumulation is unreasonable is, under section 533,7 deter-
mina:tive of the purpose to avoid tax, in the absence of• a showing 
to the contrary by the taxpayer. Second, a taxpayer is given credit 
under section 535(c)8 against its accumulated taxable income for so 
much of its accumulation as is shmm to be "for the reasonable needs 
of the business." 
While diversification is now considered a legitimate corporate 
need authorizing the accumulation of earnings and profits,0 the 
present standards of the Regulations under section 531, which, in 
general, test the reasonableness of corporate accumulations by the 
requirement of "specific, definite, and feasible plans"10 for use of 
5. The operative provision is § 532(a): "The accumulated earnings tax imposed by 
section 531 shall apply to every corporation (other than those described in subsection 
(b) [personal holding companies, foreign personal holding companies, and exempt 
organizations]) formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax 
with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by 
permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." 
6. There is some conflict whether the purpose to avoid tax must be the "dominant 
purpose" or merely one of the purposes. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits hold that 
it must be one of the "determinating" purposes. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); World Pub. Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 
1948). The Second and Fifth Circuits state that it is unnecessary to decide whether 
it is the dominant or primary purpose. Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 
424 (2d Cir. 1943); Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961). The 
First Circuit holds that it must be the "dominant" purpose. Commissioner v. Young 
Motor Co., 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1~63). In the Ninth Circuit, it is sufficient if 
tax avoidance is "one" of the purposes. Cummins Diesel Sales, Inc. v. United States, 
321 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1963). 
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 533(a) provides: "For purposes of section 532, the fact 
that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the 
reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the 
income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance 
of the evidence shall prove to the contrary." 
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 535(c) provides in pertinent part: "(1) ••• [T]he 
accumulated earnings credit is (A) an amount equal to such part of the earnings 
and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness, minus (B) the deduction allowed by subsection (b) (6) [which deduction is not 
relevant !o the scope of this comme!}t] .••• (2) The credit allowable under paragraph 
(1) shall m no case be less than the amount by which $100,000 exceeds the accumulated 
earnings and profits of ~~ co~oration at the close of the preceding taxable year." 
9. Altman, Recent Litigation Shows 5Jl Cases Can Be Won Despite Growing 
P~essu_re b! the IRS, . ~O J. TAXATION 130 (~964). Altman suggests that acceptance of 
diversification as a legitimate corporate need 1s one of the three major developments in 
§ 581 in the past decade. 
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-l(b){l) (1959). 
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the funds, seem too restrictive in terms of the problems of diversifica-
tion as outlined above. In light of this criticism and of recent devel-
opments, the purposes of this comment are (1) to indicate the basic 
principles of section 531, an understanding of which is vital to cor-
porations anticipating retention of funds for the purpose of diversi: 
fication; (2) to identify, with respect to the standards guiding the 
imposition of the accumulated earnings tax, the problems which 
Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts have for 
some time skirted but must now consider forthrightly; and (3) to 
outline a more realistic approach for testing the application of the 
accumulated earnings penalty tax. 
I. THE REQUISITE CORPORATE UNDERSTANDING OF SECTION 531 
Much of the difficulty that close corporations encounter in sec-
tion 53 I cases comes from a conceptual confusion arising from the 
peculiar nature of close corporations. Officers of close corporations 
are usually the major shareholders, and the corporate form itself 
is frequently a mere technicality.11 For instance, a business operated 
for many years as a proprietorship is often managed in exactly the 
same manner after incorporation. As a result, there is frequently a 
failure by the corporate officers to distinguish between the business 
of the corporation and the business of the shareholders, and, in 
addition, benveen legitimate corporate diversifying activities and 
those investment activities which are proper only for individuals.12 
Each of these distinctions is vital to a proper understanding of 
section 53 I. 
The necessity for the distinction between the business of the 
corporation and the business of its shareholders arises because exces-
sive accumulation is allowed under section 531 only for the reason-
able needs of the business of the corporation itself.13 In the case 
of an "incorporated proprietorship" (or partnership), when the 
business is operated as a proprietorship its operations could be said 
to be the business of the proprietor. The earnings of the business 
are taxed to him, and he is free to use the remainder of the funds 
as he pleases. Once the business is incorporated, however, the manu-
11. It has been suggested that treating close corporations as partnerships would 
go a long way toward solving accumulated earnings problems. See Chommie, Surtax 
A~idance and Extra Taxation of Corporate Earnings in the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Canada, 12 TAX L. REv. 279 (1957). · 
12. See, e.g., Cummins Diesel Sales, Inc. v. United States, 321 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1963); 
Bardahl Mfg. Corp., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. ,r 65200; Robert R. Walker, 
Inc., ~-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. ,r 65028. It must be recognized, however, 
that m some cases the corporate bounds of proper activity are so obviously over-
stepped as to indicate a deliberate violation of the statute rather than simply a con-
fused concept of the corporation's business. See, e.g., Robert R. Walker, Inc., supra 
(corporation built a house for its sole shareholder to entertain "business guests'). 
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-I(a) (1959). . 
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facture or sale of the goods or services is technically the business 
of the corporation, while the business of the shareholder is merely 
ownership of the corporation. Since the earnings of the corporation 
are taxed only at preferential corporate rates, use of the funds is 
limited to the business purposes of the corporation alone until the 
funds are distributed as dividends to the shareholder and taxed to 
him. It is this distinction that the officer-shareholders of some close 
corporations fail to make. 
A second consideration of which corporate officers must be aware 
is the limitations on the type of business upon which a corporation 
may properly embark to diversify and still avoid the imposition of 
a penalty tax under section 531. In the past the scope of corporate 
diversification was circumscribed and uncertain as a resuit of the 
very limited view of the business of a corporation taken by the 
Regulations, the Commissioner's litigation policy, and the courts 
in section 531 cases. The Regulations under the 1939 Code provided 
that radical changes in the business of a corporation on the basis 
of an accumulation of earnings and profits might themselves show 
a violation of the statute.14 Accordingly, the Commissioner attempted 
to limit corporations to the particular lines of activity in which they 
were then engaged.15 Courts sought to determine the "regular" busi-
ness of corporations and warned of "blind acceptance of marked 
sweeps from previous rudder course"16 and undertakings "which 
seem to represent business anachronism."17 While it may be true 
that a corporation will avoid shareholder taxation if it uses its re-
tained earnings and profits to embark upon a new business rather 
than distributing the funds as dividends, it must be recognized that 
the attitude expressed by the Regulations, the courts, and the Com-
missioner inhibits legitimate growth and is thus unrealistic and 
unjustified. In 1959 the Regulations were ch<!-nged to the present 
form, which states simply that "the business of a corporation is not 
merely that which it has previously carried on but includes, in gen-
14. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.102-3(b) (1939). 
15. The Commissioner has taken this position even recently. See Electric Regulator 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964), reversing 40 T.C. 757 (1963). "If 
the Treasury decides that the manufacture of 'Regohm' is the 'business,' then it would 
forever consign petitioner to the manufacture of that product and view its need 
accordingly." Id. at 345. 
16. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir. 1958). 
17. Ibid. See also Automotive Rebuilding Co., 27 P-H Tm,. Ct. Mem. 835 (1958). In 
holding an accumulation unreasonable, the Tax Court confined the taxpayer's needs 
to those of its "regular" business, although it suggested that an accumulation might 
be reasonable if the taxpayer had already engaged in another business or "immediately 
contemplated" so doing. However, in Jacob Sincoff, Inc. v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 
569 (2d Cir. 1953), the taxpayer was engaged in a securities business in addition to 
being a jobber in the paper business; nevertheless, the court thought that since invest-
ment in securities was one way of avoiding a tax on shareholders, the taxpayer 
could not argue that the needs of the securities business justified accumulating funds. 
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eral, any line of business which it may undertake/'18 There is no 
requirement in this Regulation that the new activity be related to 
the former, and the courts have implied no, such limitation. Thus, 
a corporation may change businesses, or it may take on more than 
one business without being held automatically accountable under 
section 531.19 Although courts seem to be somewhat more willing to 
approve accumulations for a second business which is related to the 
:first,2o even accumulations for totally unrelated endeavors are sanc-
tioned if the second business is actively <::arried on. 21 
The requirement that the· second business be "actively" carried 
on is an important qualification, however. Wh~le an individual may 
generally engage in any business or make any investment, corporate 
diversification is more circumscribed because of the possibility of 
tax avoidance. Legitimate corporate diversification under section 531 
contemplates only active entry into new businesses or lines of 
products.22 Passive investment in activities unrelated to the corpora-
tion's business, on the other hand, indicates that the funds so used 
are not needed in the business, and that under the theory of section 
531 they should be distributed as dividends to the shareholders, who 
can then invest them, if they desire, to diversify their own holdings. 
While recognizing that "inactive employment" of corporate earnings 
ordinarily indicates an intent to assist stockholders in tax avoidance 
and thus calls for scrutiny, courts do acknowledge that mere passive-
ness does not of itself make accumulation unreasonable if the invest- , 
ment can be classed as a liquid asset and if the taxpayer can show 
that the accumulation was dictated by a business need requiring 
the 'maintenance of a liquid position.23 For example, a temporary 
18. Treas. Reg. § l.537-3(a) (1959). 
19. Sandy Estate Co., 43 T.C. 361 (1964): 
20. See, e.g., Havens & Martin v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9417 (E.D. Va. 
1965); Buffalo Batt & Felt Corp. v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9724 (W.D.N.Y. 
1964); Carolina Rubber Hose Co., P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1f 65229; 
Alma Piston Co., 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1075 (1963); Youngs Rubber Corp., 31 P-H 
Tax Ct. Mem. 1766 (1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964). 
21. See, e.g., Sandy Estate Co., 43 T.C. 361 (1964). The magnitude and character 
of petitioner's mortgage loan activities were found sufficient to constitute a legitimate 
"business" even though entirely unrelated to petitioner's apartment house business. 
22. The requirement of "active" conduct of the new business is the clear import of 
the Treasury's re-definition of the "business" of a corporation in 1959. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.537-3 (1959). See generally Altman, supra note 9; Altman, Corporate Accu-
mulation of Earnings, 36 TAXES 933, 952 (1958). Where an entire business, is passive, 
moreover, it is policed through the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code dealing 
with personal holding companies, §§ 541-47. See generally Libin, Personal Holding 
Companies and the Revenue Act of 1964, 63 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1965). 
23. See, e.g., Oyster Shell Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1963); 
R. Gsell & Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961), reversing 34 T.C. 41 
(1960); Carolina Rubber Hose Co., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 11 65229. 
Investments in real estate activities, however, are usually considered tainted. See, 
e.g., Bardahl Mfg. Corp., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. D.EC. 1f 65200; J. Gordon 
Turnbull, Inc., 41 T.C. 358 (1963). 
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investment of funds was sanctioned where the necessity of paying 
a future tax liability was shown and considered a reasonable need 
of the business.24 Similarly, the purchase of another corporation's 
stock which was readily convertible into cash was approved where 
the purchase was made with money retained under a profit-sharing 
plan and was intended as a partial funding of the corporation's 
liability under the plan.25 Of course, if a permanent passive invest-
ment can itself be shown to be for the reasonable needs of the 
business, there is no question of its propriety, as, for instance, in 
situations involving the purchase of stock of a supplier to ensure 
a reliable source of supply,26 loans to assist a company with which 
the tax.payer does business,27 an investment in a bank with which 
the tax.payer does business,28 or the purchase of government bonds 
for use as collateral to obtain outside financing.29 While passive in-
vestments may thus be approved for limited purposes, it is othenvise 
clear that diversification of the corporate enterprise is proper only 
through the active carrying on of the new trade or business. 
II. THE STANDARDS OF SECTION 531 
While the difficulty of distinguishing carefully between the 
business of a corporation and that of the shareholders, and also 
between legitimate corporate diversification and mere diversion 
of corporate funds, may be a cause contributing to the problems 
of diversification within the framework of section 531, it is the 
responsibility of Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, and the 
24. See Mead's Bakery, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEC, 11 64104, Sec also 
Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d '79 (5th Cir. 1961); Bardahl Mfg, Corp., 
supra note 23. 
25. See John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Bremerton Sun Publishing 
Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965). 
26. See Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., supra note 25. 
2'7. See Metal Office Furniture Co., 21 P-H Tax Ct, Mem. 952 (1952) (loans made to 
benefit the taxpayer through business relations). But see Raymond I. Smith, Inc, v. 
Commissioner, 292 F.2d 4'70 (9th Cir. 1961), where an investment was found unrca• 
sonable because of a gross disproportion between commitments made and prospec-
tive benefits to taxpayer. In Henry van Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX Cr, REP. &: MEM. 
DEC. 11 64290, though the benefit to be derived from an investment was said to be 
unclear, the investment was held to be reasonably related to taxpayer's business 
since it had been motivated by business negotiations and was liquidated when the 
negotiations were broken off. 
Treas. Reg. § l.53'7-2(c) suggests three types of loans which may indicate unreason-
able accumulation: loans to shareholders, loans unrelated to the conduct of the 
business made to persons other than shareholders, and loans to corporations con-
trolled by the shareholders of the taxpayer. 
28. See Metal Office Furniture Co., supra note 27. But see Henry van Hummell, Inc., 
supra note 27, where it was held that since the taxpayer acquired only 2% of the 
bank's stock and gained no representation on the board of directors, there was no 
advantage to be derived from the investment. 
29. See Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); Sandy Estate Co,, 48 
T.C. 361 (1964). 
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courts to accord recognition to corporate realities in designing and 
applying standards to test the reasonableness of corporate accumula-
tions. From time to time overtures have been made in this direction, 
but the efforts have unfortunately fallen short of an adequate ap-
praisal of the factors involved. 
A. Congress and the Internal Revenue Service 
When Congress was considering revision of the Internal Revenue 
Code in 1954, complaints were received that the section 531 tax 
was "prejudicial to small business," was "applied in an arbitrary 
manner," and was "a constant threat to expanding business enter-
prises."30 The heart of the problem was the lack of adequate stand-
ards as to what constituted the reasonable needs of a business. Some 
of the standards which had been used to test the reasonableness of 
business needs were regarded by Congress as "erroneous or irrel-
evant."31 Indeed, it was noted that revenue agents often "applied 
their individual concepts as to business needs. "32 One test in par-
ticular which was thought to warrant specific correction was the 
requirement that there must be an immediate need for the funds 
in the business before a retention of earnings could be justified.33 
To make it clear that a corporation committed to an expenditure of 
funds should not be subject to the section 531 tax while it accumu-
lated sufficient funds to carry out its plans, section 537 was added 
to the Code, defining the reasonable needs of the business so as to 
include the reasonably anticipated needs of the business. The thrust 
of the congressional intent regarding application of this new section 
was embodied in a revision of the Regulations in 1959. The Regula-
tions now state that the reasonableness of an accumulation is to be 
30. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1954). In an effort to remedy this situa-
tion, several new provisions were enacted. First, § 534 was added to shift the burden 
of proof to the Commissioner in certain cases. It was felt that the prior procedure 
of placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer in all' cases had had a number ·of 
undesirable consequences, such as insufficient screening of cases before assertions of 
deficiencies asserted, considerable expense and effort by taxpayers in proving accumula-
tions reasonable, use of the tax as a threat to force settlement on other issues, and 
submission to the tax by taxpayers to avoid the expense of litigation. See id. at 70. 
For a discussion of how § 534 has failed to live up to the hopes for it, see generally 
Pye, Section 534 and the Shiftless Burden of Proof, 51 A.B.A.J. 784 (1965). Second, an 
accumulated earnings credit was provided for in § 535(c). See note 8 supra. The 
$60,000 (now $100,000) minimum credit was specifically designed to give small corpora-
tions an opportunity to accumulate for expansion without fear of the § 531 tax. The 
credit for so much of an accumulation as is shown to be for the reasonable needs of 
the business was included to avoid the harsh situation where most of an accumulation 
could be justified, but a small portion could not be. 
31. For example, it had been the rule that a corporation which distributed 70% 
of its earnings would not be subjected to the tax. See Treas. Dep't Release, April rn: 
~~ . 
32. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954). 
33. See, e.g., Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958). 
1142 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:1135 
determined, in general, by a "prudent businessman" test.84 However, 
in allowing a corporation to justify an accumulation of earnings 
and profits on the basis of reasonably anticipated future needs, the 
Treasury Department adopted in the Regulations the congressional 
committees' language, which requires that further standards be met. 
Thus, "there must be an indication that the future needs of the 
business require such accumulation, . . . the corporatio~ must 
have specific, definite, and feasible plans for the use of such accumula-
tion,''35 and, finally, execution of such plans must not be "postponed 
indefinite! y. "36 
B. The Courts 
While three elements-necessity, plans, and execution-are thus 
required to justify an accumulation for the reasonably anticipated 
future needs of a business, most section 531 cases have centered on 
the second of these elements, the corporate plans for the use of an 
accumulation. It has not been difficult for corporations to formulate 
some general "need," such as expansion, enlargement of working 
capital, or diversification,37 and "execution" has rarely been a critical 
consideration. When the plans have been found insufficient, the , 
question of execution has of course not been reached;38 when the 
plans have been found sufficient, they have in fact usually been 
implemented.89 In focusing their attention upon the second element, 
the plans for the use of the accumulated funds, the courts have 
placed great reliance on the _standard of specificity, definiteness, and 
feasibility of the plans.40 Several recent cases, however, indicate a 
certain degree of judicial disenchantment with the standards for 
evaluating the sufficiency of the plans.41 The courts in these cases 
have felt constrained to talk in terms of the congressional language 
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-l(a) (1959). 
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-l(b)(l) (1959). 
36. Ibid. 
37. See, e.g., Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1956); Robert R. 
Walker, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. &: MEM. DEc. 11 65028. In J. Gordon Turnbull, 
Inc., 41 T.C. 358 (1963), however, taxpayer's investments in unrelated activities were 
thought to indicate that there was no need for the funds in the business, 
. 38. ~ee, e.g., Carlen Realty Co. v. Tomlinson, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas, 11 9425 (5th Cir. 
1965); Robert R. Walker, Inc., supra note 37. 
39. See, e.g., Alma Piston Co., 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1075 (1963). 
40. See, e.g., Henry van Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX Cr. REP.&: MEM. DEc, 1164290, 
at 1954-64: "The cases have held repeatedly, and the ••• Regulation requires, that 
the corporation .•• must have definite and specific plans for this use." See also Dar• 
row Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1961); I. A. Dress Co, v. Commis-
sioner, 273 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960); Robert R. Walker, Inc., 
P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP.&: MEM. DEC. 11 65028. 
41. Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964), reversing 
40 T.C. 757 (1963); Oman Constr. Co., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. &: MEr,t. DEC, 11 65325; 
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 11 65248; Carolina 
Rubber Ho~e Co., P·H 1965 TAX ~T. REP. &: MEM. DEc. 11 65229; Alma Piston Co,, 
32 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 1075 (1963). 
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and the language of the Regulations, but they have qualified that 
language in such a way as to indicate a recognition that the standard 
of specificity holds no magic in itself. Rather, it is merely a frequently 
convenient measure of the likelihood that a corporation will follow 
through with an avowed goal. As the courts which have been troubled 
by the specificity standard recognize, there are other instances where 
specificity of plans is not a realistic standard by which to test cor-
porate accumulations. It is suggested that this is especially true when 
the "business need" identified is diversification. As noted previously, 
opportunities for diversification are not always readily available, 
and a corporation legitimately planning to undertake diversification 
out of internally generated funds may often be required to accu-
mulate funds for an indefinite period without specific plans for their 
use. While the courts must not permit violations of section 531, 
neither must they ignore these realities of corporate life. 
III. A NEW .APPROACH 
The approach of the courts in recent cases has been that if a 
corporation is able to demonstrate, by reference to factors other 
than specificity of plans, a sufficient likelihood that it will follow 
through with its expressed intentions for use of accumulated funds, 
the mere absence of specificity of plans should not warrant section 
531 liability. The analysis required by this approach involves a 
more extended inquiry into the facts of each case than a mere search 
for specific plans. In addition, if this approach is indicative of a · 
trend, section 531 cases will depend more than ever upon the facts 
of each case. It is possible, nevertheless, to categorize certain situa-
tions and to identify certain factors which would indicate when 
and to what extent the rigidity of the specificity requirement might 
be relaxed. 
A. Involuntary Diversification 
When diversification is involuntary-that is, when there are 
hazards facing a business which would indicate to a prudent busi-
nessman the need for diversification-the likelihood of a planned 
diversification becoming a reality is increased sufficiently to allow 
a concomitant decrease in the reliance on the specificity of the plans, 
so long as there is some additional evidence that the taxpayer intends 
to meet the hazards. Of course, funds may not legitimately be 
accumulated for unrealistic hazards/2 for "vague and unsupported 
premonitions of the future,''43 or for "unexpected demands" or 
42. Treas. Reg. § l.537•2(c)(5) (1959). 
43. Youngs Rubber Corp., 31 P·H Tax Ct. Mero. 1766 (1962), afj'd, 331 F.2d 12 
(2d Cir. 1964). Compare KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951), 
and Southland Indus., Inc., 15 P·H Tax Ct. Mem. 897 (1946), with Havens & Martin 
v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1[ 9417 (E.D. Va. 1965). 
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"unanticipated emergencies."44 When the hazards are real, however, 
the remedial measures undertaken by the taxpayer are likely to be 
just as real. Furthermore, that the hazard is only a contingency 
should be immaterial, because regardless of the occurrence of the 
contingent event, the important points are whether the taxpayer 
reasonably believes that it will be forced to enter a new business 
and whether it intends to enter the new business when and if the 
imminence of the threat should demand such action.40 Thus, it has 
been persuasively argued that "a corporation which sees a financial 
storm on the horizon should be able to accumulate earnings merely 
to weather the storm, to provide a cushion against a foreseeable 
drain on earnings and/or capital without having to use the funds 
for diversification~a diversification which might not be needed when 
the financial storm has passed."46 Although it did not arise in the 
diversification setting, the recent case of Oman Constr. Co.47 is illus-
trative of this principle. Taxpayer, a heavy construction company, 
retained earnings in order to protect against the risks of loss which 
were particularly acute in its foreign construction projects because 
of transportation hazards, political upheaval, native labor problems, 
currency exchange limitations, health risks, and communications 
difficulties. In addition, in taxpayer's business it bid on many jobs 
but did not know in advance which bids would be successful. Once 
a bid was accepted, however, taxpayer was committed to complete 
the job, with the constant possibility of having to buy more equip-
ment. While it has frequently been held in the past that a corpora-
tion may reasonably protect against contingencies,48 here the Com-
missioner argued that taxpayer must have specific plans for use of 
its accumulated funds in order to justify their retention. Although 
taxpayer had no specific plans for the use of its accumulated funds 
for each purpose identified, further analysis' showed sufficient pos-
sibility of use of the funds for equipment, qualification to bid, losses, 
renegotiation refunds, and maintaining an organization of engineers 
and superintendents, that the Tax Court found that the accumula-
44. Smoot Sand &: Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
354 U.S. 922, rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1957). 
45. Smoot Sand &: Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 44. The court of 
appeals reversed the Tax Court, which had said that the taxpayer never planned to 
enter the new business voluntarily and that the contingency which might have forced 
it to do so never developed. 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 330 (1956). See also Havens &: 
Martin v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 'J 9417 (E.D. Va. 1965). 
46. Henry van Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX Or. REP. &: MEM, DEC, 'J 64290, at 
1954-64 (dictum); cf. Ted Bates &: Co., P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. &: MEM. DEC, 'J 65251. 
47. P-H 1965 TAX Or. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 'J 65325. 
48. See, e.g., Smoot Sand &: Gravel Corp v. Commissioner, 241 F,2d 197 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922, rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1957). But see Henry van 
Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 'J 64290 (plans for contingency 
must be specific). • 
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tion for the "collective" purposes could not be said to be unrea-
sonable. 
When the hazards are both realized and permanent rather than 
merely contingent, the effort to diversify will ordinarily be more 
intensive, but the problem of specificity of plans is the same. One 
of the most persuasive evidences that a "permanent hazard" is 
confronting a corporation is a decline in business. While some 
business declines might be reversed by cutting costs or increasing 
sales promotion, often the only way to remedy the decline is to 
diversify into a new business or line of products. An examination 
of the reasons for a decline in business is thus necessary in order 
to determine the probability of diversification taking place because 
of the decline. The strongest case is a complete cutting off of the 
taxpayer's business, as, for instance, through loss of a franchise. 
Here, a corporation's only alternative to dissolution is to enter a 
new business. Therefore, unless such a taxpayer is making no bona 
fide effort to find a suitable new business, the absence of specific 
plans should not warrant a section 531 penalty.49 Almost as con-
vincing a situation is one involving a technological change which 
causes the taxpayer's product to become obsolescent. The extent of 
both the innovation and the resultant obsolescence must be exam-
ined, but where they indicate continued decline or eventual ter-
mination of the taxpayer's business, the situation is the same as 
above.50 In Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner,51 for example, 
taxpayer argued that technological change in its industry necessitated 
49. In Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1956), the taxpayer corpora-
tion had operated a Chevrolet dealership which was cancelled on October 31, 1948, 
leaving the taxpayer with $750,000 in idle funds. When the corporation was liquidated 
in 1953 upon the death of the sole shareholder, however, it still had not undertaken 
any new business. This delay is of itself, of course, some evidence of an intent to avoid 
tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-I(b)(2) (1959). In addition, there was little evidence that 
any real effort had been made to find a new business, except an expression of concern 
in the minutes of the corporation and a change in the corporate charter to permit the 
carrying on of a real estate business. While diversification opportunities may not be 
readily available, certainly it must be recognized that there comes a point at which 
failure to put idle funds to work must be penalized. 
50. In Buffalo Batt & Felt Corp. v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9724 
(W.D.N.Y. 1964), an accumulation was held reasonable where, because of the develop-
ment of substitutes for cotton batting in the furniture industry, and because the 
furniture and textile industries were moving to the South and thus impairing taxpayer's 
ability to compete, taxpayer expected severe declines in its business. Taxpayer was 
"contemplating" production of a synthetic fiber fill and was "considering" acquisition 
of a furniture company. 
In Youngs Rubber Corp., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 1766 (1962), a/fd, 331 F.2d 12 
(2d Cir. 1964), taxpayer, a manufacturer of rubber prophylactics, had already diversified 
into other lines of similar products to meet the competitive threat of oral contra-
ceptives. An accumulation of $500,000 labeled simply for "technological progress,'' was 
thus thought by the court to be unreasonable. 
51. 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964), reversing 40 T.C. 757 (1963). 
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the retention of funds to develop new products. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's finding of 
unreasonable accumulation, noting that in this day of rapid tech-
nological change products may quickly become outmoded and it is 
not always possible for a corporation to have a specific goal at the 
time funds are set aside. "Comments made in the past to the effect 
that a definite plan actually followed through must be on the com-
pany's books and records before moneys assigned thereto become 
anticipated needs may have to be appropriately qualified in particular 
cases."62 The court noted that taxpayer, a manufacturer of electric 
regulating devices, was in a field where technological change was a 
particularly relevant consideration. Indeed, demand for taxpayer's 
primary product had recently fallen off to the extent that it had 
been forced to develop a number of new products, necessitating 
greater space and equipment. The possibility of a recurrence of such 
a decline required that taxpayer be allowed t_o accumulate funds to 
develop new products. Also illustrative of the extent to which tech-
nological change will spur diversification is 4-lma Piston Go.,tm in 
which taxpayer, a supplier of automotive clutches, suffered a business 
decline when automatic transmissions were introduced on a large 
scale. During a four-year period, taxpayer accumulated funds with 
which it hoped to acquire a new business. The Commissioner as-
sessed a section 531 penalty tax, arguing that taxpayer had no specific 
plans during the accumulation period, but the Tax Court, noting that 
a new business had eventually been acquired after lengthy negotia-
tions, stated that "in our view such plans were specific and definite 
and were clearly feasible as is established by their consumma-
tion .... "64 Certainly it can be questioned whether taxpayer's plans 
were indeed "specific" during all of the years in issue; nevertheless, 
there would appear, by reason of the nature of taxpayer's business 
decline and its intensive search for a new business, to have been 
sufficient likelihood of diversification that the accumulation was 
properly held reasonable. 
Finally, instances may occur where the taxpayer's buyers suffer 
a decline in business which is then reflected in taxpayer's business. 
The persuasiveness of this reason for accumulation of funds with a 
view to diversification depends in turn upon the reason for the 
buyers' decline, but to the extent that the decline is caused by factors 
which render the taxpayer's position incapable of improvement by 
means other than diversification; once again diversification is prob-
able even apart from specific plans. For example, in Carolina Rubber 
52. Id. at 346. 
53. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1075 (1963). 
54. Id. at 1094. 
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Hose Co./'5 taxpayer was engaged in the railroad hose business, but 
planned to convert to the rubber roll business because of the decline 
of railroads. Once again the Commissioner asserted that the plans 
were not sufficiently specific. The court, although apparently con-
vinced that taxpayer would eventually consummate its plans, was 
very much concen:ied with the specificity requirement of the Regu-
lations. The court finally concluded, however, that the plans were 
not "so uncertain or vague as to be disqualified."56 Here again the 
strict specificity of the plans could probably be drawn into question, 
but the indicia of the necessity for modernization and diversification 
were sufficient to indicate the likelihood that taxpayer would accom-
plish its avowed intention. The court acknowledged that further 
developments might prove its judgment wrong, but stated that sub-
sequent years must be judged in light of the facts as they then exist.57 
The mere fact that a business is faced with hazards cannot of 
course be said to indicate conclusively that an accumulation--of funds 
is for the reasonable needs of the business. However, to the extent 
that the pressures caused by the hazards indicate that the business 
must undertake diversification to rectify the situation, and to the 
extent that the taxpayer indicates that it is embarking on those 
steps as an alternative to stagnation or dissolution of the business, 
it seems reasonable that the emphasis placed upon the requirement 
of specific plans for use of an accumulation should be decreased. 
B. Voluntary Diversification 
It is clear that a corporation may, of its own free will, accumulate 
funds in order to diversify its operations. When the diversification 
is purely voluntary, however, the standards for testing the accumu-
lation must be strict. In such cases, requiring specificity of plans may 
be the best way to ensure that a corporation will follow through with 
the diversification and not merely accumulate funds, avoid taxation, 
and yet continue to claim that it intends to diversify. Even here, 
however, there may be instances when specific plans should not be 
required. This was the case in Freedom Newspapers, Inc.,58 where 
taxpayer, which accumulated funds to acquire other newspaper pub-
lishing companies, successfully overcame the Commissioner's charge 
of lack of specific plans by showing that its need for expansion and 
55. P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1f 65229. 
56. Id. at 1281-65. But see Robert R. Walker, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. 8: MEM. 
DEc. ,r 65028. In Walker, taxpayer transported Studebaker automobiles, but in 1957 
was investigating new "lines of business because Studebaker's business was declining. 
The Tax Court held, however, that since in 1957 the taxpayer had no specific plans 
for the use of its accumulated earnings, those earnings were unreasonable. 
'57. P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1f 65229, at 1282-65. 
58. P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. 8: MEM. DEC. 1f 65248. 
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acquisition of other newspapers was reasonable, in view of a trend 
in the newspaper business toward consolidation and large chain 
operations, a desire for greater dissemination of its political views, 
the need to give promising young executives greater responsibility 
and financial opportunity, and, finally, taxpayer's history of acquisi-
tions. The Tax Court, in holding the accumulation reasonable, 
analyzed the sp~cificity requirement in the context of the particular 
business involved, and concluded that where opportunities for ex-
pansion and acquisition are not readily available, plans need not 
be as definite as might othenvise be required to support a finding of 
reasonableness. The court recognized the unique nature of the news-
paper industry and decided that since newspapers were not fungible 
commodities, it was not possible for the taxpayer to acquire another 
newspaper immediately upon a decision to do so. The most a tax-
payer in such a situation may be able to do, it was concluded, is to 
demonstrate "a concurrent course of action . . . directed toward 
the averred purpose of accumulation,"50 or, in other words, "actively 
[to] search out opportunities for acquisitions."60 Thus, even in the 
voluntary diversification situation it may be possible for a corpora-
tion to set forth sufficient indicia that the likelihood of diversifica-
tion occurring can reasonably be said to outweigh the possibility of 
a section 531 violation.61 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has been presented on the basis of re-
ported cases. It may be that, in the many instances which never reach 
the courts, the attitude of examining agents and regional settlement 
officers toward the above problems is actually more reasonable than 
that reflected by the Commissioner's litigation policy. Nevertheless, 
litigated cases, with the exception of those referred to above, indicate 
a strict policy on the part of the Service and the courts. Since it is 
_important that taxpayers not be deterred from valid diversification 
and economic growth, it is suggested that steps be taken to reassure 
taxpayers that their good faith efforts will not be thwarted by what 
appear to be the unduly restrictive standards now used to determine 
the permissibility under section 531 of accumulation of funds. Per-
haps what the courts have been doing in the recent cases previously 
discussed is simply applying the Regulations' general test of the 
59. Id. at 1465-65. 
60. Ibid. 
61. See also Mead's Bakery, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX CT. Rl!.P. &: MEM. DEC. 1J 64104, 
where taxpayer, in order to obtain a loan, was required to agree not to enter any 
new line of business. The court held reasonable an accumulation of funds with a 
view to entering the potato chip and frozen baked goods businesses, which taxpayer 
had entered indirectly through its shareholders with the understanding that it would 
acquire the businesses directly when the loan restrictions were lifted. 
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"prudent businessman." If so, it would seem advisable to eliminate 
the specificity requirement from the regulatory criteria, and to make 
specificity merely a factor to be employed where useful. In addition, 
to give some guidance to taxpayers and revenue agents, revenue 
rulings and examples in the Regulations should be published to 
show the types of situations in which a mere absence of specific 
plans should not warrant the imposition of the accumulated earnings 
penalty tax. 
James C. Westin 
